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PUZZLING ABOUT STATE EXCUSES AS AN
INSTANCE OF GROUP EXCUSES 
François Tanguay-Renaud* 
A. WHY  REFLECT UPON STATE EXCUSES & HOW I INTEND TO DO SO 
Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their 
personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified 
wrongdoing by invoking duress, provocation, a reasonable mistake in 
justification, or other types of excuses? Insofar as it can, should such 
claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? It is certainly not 
uncommon to encounter offhand statements to the effect that at least some 
state excuses are both conceivable and legitimate.1
*Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, and Member of the Graduate Faculty
of the Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto. I would like to thank Antony 
Duff, Timothy Endicott, John Gardner, Stuart P. Green, Philip Pettit, Andrew Simester, 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Victor Tadros, and Ekow Yankah for constructive 
discussions, comments, and criticisms. Special thanks are also owed to the participants in 
the two workshops that led to the production of this volume, the Oxford Jurisprudence 
Discussion Group, as well as the 2011 York University Graduate Student Philosophy 
conference where this paper was presented as a keynote address.   
 Yet, the issue has yet 
to receive the sustained philosophical attention it deserves. Few theorists 
speak to it specifically, and those who do typically discard rather rashly 
the possibility of genuine state excuses. This theoretical neglect is 
symptomatic of a more general lack of analytical attention to the 
conditions that must obtain for the state to be legitimately held responsible 
for wrongdoing in law and morality. In this chapter, my aim is to start 
filling this gap by mapping out the topic of state excuses in a way that 
will, hopefully, spur a more systematic discussion of its various facets, 
1 For example, in his recent book on The Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 131, NW Barber writes that ‘A state which enters into an unjust war in a 
climate of moral panic is, all other things being equal, less reprehensible than a state 
which enters into that same war whilst fully aware of its injustice’. For an argument 
assuming the availability of at least some excuses for domestic state wrongdoing, see eg 
T Sorell, ‘Morality and Emergency’ (2003) 103 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
21, 33-34. 
"2
including its relationship with the wider question of when the state may 
legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences for 
wrongdoing. I say that my aim is limited to ‘mapping out’ the topic 
because I believe that an important first step in understanding state 
excuses is to identify properly the many complex and controversial 
theoretical puzzles they raise.  
In a bid to remain ecumenical, I will adopt a wide understanding of 
excuses that comprises the core pleas which, for right or for wrong, have 
sometimes been treated as excuses in recent theoretical debates about 
individual responsibility in morality and law. By that, I mean claims that 
although a given course of conduct was, all things considered, wrong, it 
was not blameworthy—or was less blameworthy, in the case of a partial 
excuse—because it was (1) ‘justified’ or ‘warranted’ from the epistemic 
perspective of the actor, (2) reasonably motivated by reasonable emotions 
or other understandable cognitive or affective attitudes, (3) non-
responsible, or (4) a hybrid of two or more of these claims. Of course, 
there are important differences between these four types of claims. In fact, 
some think of these differences as being so salient that they exclude the 
first type of claim from the category of excuses altogether and reclassify it 
as justificatory. Others, who argue that excuses are primarily reasons-
based and responsibility-affirming, would differentiate the third type of 
claim, and perhaps some instances of the fourth, as claims of ‘exemption’ 
from responsibility or ‘denial of responsibility’ simpliciter. While these 
reclassifications often track deep and important dissimilarities,2 they 
remain contentious. Given the exploratory nature of my project, I avoid 
pre-empting meaningful discussion of any possible state excuses by 
assuming that restrictive views such as these can simply be transposed, 
without argument, onto the domain of state responsibility.  
Claims of state justification tend not to elicit the same amount of 
suspicion as claims of state excuses. For example, arguments about the 
justification of state coercion, state punishment, and state-led warfare 
2 I emphasize some of them in relation to individual excuses in F Tanguay-Renaud, 
‘Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law’ in F Tanguay-Renaud and J 
Stribopoulos (eds), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the 
Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2012) 21. 
3"
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pervade moral, political, and legal philosophy. Yet, it is not unusual to 
find moral and criminal law theorists who, like Andrew Simester, maintain 
that excuses ‘are simply inapplicable to artificial actors such as the state.’3 
This assumption is also deeply entrenched in other legal fields concerned 
with the regulation of state wrongdoing. For example, Alan Brudner writes 
that, while they may be justified in infringing rights, ‘States cannot be 
constitutionally excused for violating rights’.4   
Such brisk rejections of state excuses are intriguing, especially 
given the fact that the law of several oft-theorized jurisdictions provides 
for blame and even punishment of the state and state organs for 
wrongdoing. For example, the Criminal Code of Canada makes clear that 
‘municipalities’ and other ‘public bodies’ may, like private organizations, 
be held responsible and punished for criminal wrongdoing.5 In the context 
of some civil actions, public authorities may also be subjected to punitive 
damages.6
3 AP Simester, ‘Necessity, Torture and the Rule of Law’ in VV Ramraj (ed), Emergencies 
and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 289, 300. 
 The constitutional context is no exception. Admittedly, 
constitutional law continues to be primarily understood in terms of the 
regulation of the legal validity of exercises of state powers, rather than in 
terms of the regulation of state wrongdoing, as evidenced by the remedies 
usually granted for rights violations—that is, legal invalidity and 
procedural remedies such as exclusion of evidence or stay of proceedings. 
That being said, state constitutional wrongdoing is regularly condemned 
and may even be punished. For example, punitive damages are sometimes 
4 A Brudner, ‘Excusing Necessity and Terror: What Criminal Law Can Teach 
Constitutional Law’ (2009) 3 Crim L and Philosophy 147, 148 (Emphasis in the original). 
5 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, ss 2, 22.1, 22.2. Here, Canada is not alone. See eg SP 
Green, ‘The Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments’ (1994) 72 North Carolina L 
Rev 1197 and N Kyoto, ‘Criminal Liability of Corporations – Japan’ in H de Doelder and 
K Tiedemann (eds), Criminal Liability of Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996) 275, 
283. Other jurisdictions are more hostile to holding state bodies criminally responsible. 
Consider, for example, France (Code pénal, s 121-2) and the Netherlands (see R de 
Lange, ‘Political and Criminal Responsibility’ (2002) 6(4) Electronic J of Comparative L 
s 7 <http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-18.html>). 
6 See eg Criminal Liability and Proceedings Act RSC 1985 c C-50, ss 17-18 (Canada). 
 "
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deemed an ‘appropriate and just remedy’ for egregiously unjustified 
violations of rights under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.7 At the level of international law, the possibility of criminally 
censuring and punishing states for wrongdoing has often been 
contemplated and defended over the years, even if the legal status of 
‘international crimes of state’ remains uncertain.8 Be that as it may, 
condemnation of state behaviour in United Nations resolutions, as well as 
through diplomatic channels, is a commonplace. Last but not least, 
popular and political indictments of states and state bodies as 
‘wrongdoers’ or ‘criminal’ abound, as do philosophers’ characterizations 
of such entities as moral agents susceptible of moral censure for wrongful 
deeds.9
 
  
Of course, the questions of whether and how the state may 
legitimately be blamed or punished for wrongdoing, as well as what 
understandings of ‘the state’ render such inquiries intelligible, require 
                                                 
7 See eg Crossman v The Queen (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 588 (Federal Court, Trial Division); 
Patenaude v Roy (1988), 46 CCLT 173 (Superior Court of Quebec); Freeman v West 
Vancouver (District) (1991), 24 ACWS (3d) 936 (Supreme Court of British Columbia). 
 
8 The concept of state responsibility for international crimes gained support following the 
First World War, but was pushed back into the background by the development of the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law after the Second 
World War. For an argument that international crimes of state are currently on the 
threshold between lex ferenda and lex lata, see NHB Jørgensen, The Responsibility of 
States for International Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For a forceful 
defense of the intelligibility and legitimacy of state criminalization in international law, 
see D Luban, ‘State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal Law’ in T 
Isaacs and R Vernon (eds), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 61.  
 
9 In respect of the state considered as a whole, recall Hannah Arendt’s writings on the 
acts of Adolf Eichmann: ‘crimes of this kind were and could only be, committed under a 
criminal law and by a criminal state.’ H Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963) 240. Consider also claims, like John 
Gardner’s, that ‘States are moral agents too…The state must not murder or be complicit 
in murder. It must not rape or be complicit in rape. It must not rob or be complicit in 
robbery…The state is also bound, even in its exercises of authority and its uses of 
coercion, by the general principles of morality that bind us all.’ J Gardner, ‘Prohibiting 
Immoralities’ (2006) 28 Cardozo L Rev 2613, 2628.  
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further investigation in their own right.10
 
 In this chapter, though, I start 
with the assumption that at least some of the practices of blame and 
punishment listed above are legitimate and target entities which detractors 
of state excuses would, or should, themselves readily incorporate in their 
understanding of the state.    
 The question then becomes what reasons there may be for thinking 
that exculpatory claims of excuses—as opposed to, say, claims of 
justification—are unavailable to the state and, thus, should not be 
recognized. First, it bears acknowledging that some do not share my 
working assumption, and believe that whatever the state does is 
necessarily justified. Therefore, they argue, the question of state excuses 
never arises. This position finds both moral and legal instantiations. At the 
moral level, some equate the state with the justified pursuit of the public 
interest and characterize as private, or non-state, any actions that depart 
from it. At the legal level, the argument tends to be that the state is no 
more and no less than a (domestic) legal system, such that no deed can be 
attributed to it at the domestic level unless that deed is legally authorized 
or permitted in some way—for example, through the recognition of a legal 
justification. Such challenges to the intelligibility of unjustified state 
wrongdoing and, thus, to the possibility of state excuses are, in my view, 
exceedingly myopic. As I argue elsewhere, they fail to give sufficient 
consideration to the complexity of what many modern states’ socio-legal 
constitutions enable them to do, sometimes in defiance of morality or 
extralegally. They also fail to give adequate attention to existing practices 
of moral and legal censure for behaviour that can be said, to some 
meaningful extent, to be organizationally programmed by the state.11
 
 What 
is more, they tend to ride roughshod over many important puzzles related 
to what specific justifications should be afforded (or not) to the state for 
prima facie wrongdoing. Thus, I mostly disregard such contentions here. 
                                                 
10 I seek to make some progress in addressing these underexplored questions in F 
Tanguay-Renaud, ‘Criminalizing the State’ (2012) Crim L and Philosophy (forthcoming). 
 
11  See ibid, as well as F Tanguay-Renaud, ‘The Intelligibility of Extralegal State Action: 
A General Lesson for Debates on Public Emergencies and Legality’ (2010) 16 Legal 
Theory 161. 
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I say ‘mostly,’ because there may still be a methodological lesson 
to be drawn from such challenges. As I suggested above, even if we accept 
that unjustified state wrongdoing is intelligible, there remains an important 
debate to be had about how it can best be explained. Should we think of 
states, and state bodies or institutions, as real and irreducible moral agents 
who, like individual human agents, can perpetrate wrongs and, possibly, 
also claim excuses for themselves? Or should we instead concede that 
wrongdoing states are no more than fictions to which the conduct, wrongs, 
blameworthiness and, perhaps, excuses of certain human agents may 
legitimately be attributed? This controversy about the nature of the state 
and state responsibility is not new in moral and legal theory circles, and 
parallels in many ways debates about the responsibility of organizations 
more generally.12 As I indicated earlier, I cannot get to the bottom of this 
controversy here. Yet, I can also not ignore it completely, given its 
undeniable relevance to the question of whether and how we should think 
of state excuses. Therefore, in sections B and C below, I will appraise the 
plausibility of state claims of excuses in terms of both of these leading 
paradigms, and suggest that some such claims are indeed consistent with 
both. Note, however, that since excuses, as I understand them, are 
primarily rebuttals of blameworthiness, since the core case of blame is 
blame that has a blameworthy moral agent as its direct object, and since 
the attribution of blameworthiness to, and blaming of, a posited fiction is 
at best a non-standard case,13
                                                 
12 For a useful survey of such general debates, see P Cane, Responsibility in Law and 
Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 143-171. 
 I will consider the realist paradigm first, and 
the fiction paradigm second. Note further that, in both cases, I will 
primarily focus on the possibility of state excuses in morality. While my 
arguments will also often bear directly on the possibility of state excuses 
in law, and while I will sometimes even explicitly discuss legal excuses, I 
 
13 I take this understanding of the core case of blame and blameworthiness to be broadly 
accepted amongst theorists, irrespective of whether they consider blame to be primarily 
an evaluative, punitive, or relations-adjusting practice. See eg TM Scanlon, Moral 
Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2008) 
128, 160-166; J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 227; G Sher, In Praise of Blame 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 114; J Glover, Responsibility (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) 44. 
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wish to leave open for further consideration the question of whether moral 
excuses should always be given legal effect. 
 
With such caveats in mind, let me ask again: assuming that 
wrongdoing can be attributed to the state in some way or the other, and 
that the state can be morally, criminally, constitutionally, or internationally 
blamed and, perhaps even, punished for it, why should excuses be 
unavailable to it? Objections are typically of two kinds. Some are 
metaphysical. They rest on the assumption that excuses reflect profoundly 
human characteristics and are, therefore, unavailable to organizations such 
as states and institutional state bodies. Other objections are moral and hold 
that, even if the state and its institutional organs are entities that can 
invoke excuses, such claims should not be recognized given the moral 
position of the state. In what follows, I discuss objections of both kinds.  
 
It is worth noting, at this stage, that many objections of the first 
type, and perhaps also some of the second, may be aimed at organizations 
more generally, and not only at the state and its corporate organs. 
Accordingly, my inquiry will also be of relevance to the question of 
whether organizations, considered as a class, can intelligibly and 
legitimately make excuses.14 I choose to focus on the state, however, out 
of concern that organizations such as private companies with more 
restricted constitutional aims and purposes and more constrained means of 
action may not as persuasively or generally be subject to blame qua 
irreducible agents—the first paradigm to be investigated.15
                                                 
14 The question of the availability of excuses to non-state organizations, such as private 
corporations, is also notoriously under-theorized. Some theorists assume that 
corporations can simply ‘mak[e] use of any available general excuses’. See J Horder, 
Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 262. However, most leading 
theorists of corporate responsibility simply ignore the topic altogether. See eg C Wells, 
Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); B 
Fisse and J Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). Such broad-brush approaches are manifestly 
unsatisfactory given, on the one hand, the existence of widespread regimes of corporate 
criminal liability that beg the question of the availability of excuses to corporations and, 
on the other, the many objections of the types leveled against state excuses that extend to 
corporate excuses generally. 
 I am also of the 
 
15 Part of my concern is shared by TM Scanlon, who writes that ‘The possibility of 
blaming collective agents seems clearest when one moves away from entities such as 
 "
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view that state excuses call for a discussion of further interesting moral 
objections that do not apply, or do not apply with the same force, to other 
organizations. That said, it is my hope that, insofar as my analysis is 
applicable to other organizations, the reader will be inclined to employ it, 
mutatis mutandis, to elucidate the intelligibility and legitimacy of their 
excuses.  
 
B. EXCUSING THE STATE QUA IRREDUCIBLE MORAL AGENT? 
 
1 Philip Pettit’s Model of Corporate/State Agency 
 
An increasing number of contemporary theorists conceive of the state as a 
kind of corporate (group, collective—I use these terms as synonyms) 
organization that can itself be a moral agent. How can this be if, according 
to the time-honoured objection, corporate organizations have no 
discernible bodies or minds of their own? The argument tends to rest on 
the assumption that some groups of interacting human beings can be 
relatively autonomous agents—that is, that they can form action-directing 
attitudes such as intentions, develop plans, and perform concerted actions, 
that cannot be fully reduced to those of their members—thanks at least in 
part to the operation of a normative framework. Modern states, which are 
made-up of various institutional organs themselves reliant on the agency 
of countless individuals whose identity changes over time,16
                                                                                                                         
soap companies to collective agents that purport to be guided by noncommercial aims, 
and when one considers blame by individuals whose relation to these agents is something 
closer than that of consumer and producer.’ Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (n 13) 165. 
 are often 
thought to fall in this category, alongside other similarly integrated 
corporate bodies. These states all have a constitution that constitutes and 
divides labour between their various organs, lays out principles of 
governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making, control, and 
review mechanisms. By jointly committing and adhering to this 
 
16 What individuals are comprised in the corporate organization of the state can be a 
matter of controversy. John Rawls picks up on one aspect of this debate when he 
distinguishes between ‘states, as traditionally conceived’ and ‘liberal democratic peoples 
(and decent peoples).’ While the latter necessarily include ordinary citizens in the 
organizational unit of evaluation, the former may not. J Rawls, The Law of Peoples 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) 23-30. 
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constitution to a reasonable extent, individual members allow their state 
qua corporate entity to form judgments and exhibit attitudes as a coherent 
whole, and to make reasonably consistent decisions over time on the 
evaluative propositions (including moral and legal reasons) that they 
present to it for consideration. Individual members also enable their state 
to execute its decisions by complying with constitutionally-adopted action 
plans—in the form of rules, practices, directives, and commands—devised 
to implement them.  
 
The thought, then, is that modern states often have what it takes to 
be moral agents proper. Like other moral agents, they are regularly 
confronted with normatively significant choices, involving the possibility 
of doing right or wrong. Through the intercession of their individual 
members, they may also have the understanding and access to evidence 
necessary for making normative judgments about these choices, as well as 
the capacity to implement them in the world. Crucially, though, as I imply 
above, if they are to count as moral agents in their own right, states qua 
corporate organizations must also have the required control over the said 
judgments. That is, they must be able to judge and plan for action in ways 
that are irreducible to the judgments and plans of other agents, including 
those of their members. To see how this is possible, Philip Pettit’s recent 
account of group agency is most helpful. Pettit’s account remains one of, 
if not the, most careful and sophisticated account of irreducible group 
agency to date, and it is also one of the only such accounts to be quite 
transparently applicable to complex groups like states.17
                                                 
17 See especially P Pettit, ‘Responsibility Incorporated’ (2007) 117 Ethics 171, and P 
Pettit, ‘The Reality of Group Agents’ in C Mantzavinos (ed), Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 67, 89. It is important to acknowledge that many of Pettit’s 
insights were developed in collaboration with Christian List, as made clear in their recent 
comprehensive restatement of the argument in C List and P Pettit, Group Agency: The 
Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). However, since the separate articles on which I rely most were authored by Pettit 
himself, I keep referring to him alone, as a shorthand. See also other generally less 
developed accounts along similar veins in D Copp, ‘On the Agency of Certain Collective 
Entities: An Argument from “Normative Autonomy”’ in P French and HK Wettstein 
(eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, 
vol XXX (Boston: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 194; M Gilbert, Sociality and 
Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory (Lanham, Md: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2000) ch 8; O O’Neill, ‘Who Can Endeavour Peace?’ in D Copp (ed), Nuclear 
 As a result, I use 
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it as the main backdrop for my analysis, with the hope that most of the 
general insights I derive from its scrutiny will hold even if specific aspects 
of the account end up being refuted in future arguments.  
 
Pettit argues that groups whose judgments depend on the 
judgments of more than one individual can be agents insofar as they 
respond rationally to their environment on a reasonably consistent basis. 
Constitutions facilitate group agency by assigning decisional roles to the 
group’s members and setting limits on what they can and cannot do. To 
the extent that the group’s constitution provides sufficient constraints 
against internal inconsistencies, the group operating under it may then be a 
relatively autonomous agent over time (despite deriving all its matter and 
energy from its individual human members). Pettit argues that 
constitutional constraints are sufficient for a group to be autonomous in 
this sense when they ensure that, under normal conditions, reason is 
‘collectivized,’ such that majority views do not always prevail and the 
group’s attitudes cannot be described as a simple majoritarian function of 
the members’ attitudes. In Pettit’s own words: ‘Autonomy is intuitively 
guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgment of the 
group will have to be functionally independent of the corresponding 
member judgments, so that its intentional attitudes as a whole are more 
saliently unified by being, precisely, the attitudes of the group.’18
                                                                                                                         
Weapons, Deterrence, and Disarmament (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol 12, 
Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1986) 41; P French, Collective and Corporate 
Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
 He also 
insists that decision procedures must be in place to guarantee that the 
group can change and correct its irreducible attitudes over time, so as to 
 
18 Pettit, ‘Responsibility Incorporated’ (n 17) 184. Pettit claims that a central case of such 
group autonomy obtains when the group’s constitution effectively requires members to 
aggregate their judgments on individual premises of decisions, rather than their final 
judgments on overall decisions in a simple majoritarian way. He also allows for other 
suitable decisional arrangements, including more complex ‘distributed premise-based 
procedures’ where different subgroups specialize on judging specific premises. These 
conclusions come out primarily of Pettit’s treatment of the well-known discursive 
dilemma. See eg C List and P Pettit, ‘Group Agency and Supervenience’ in J Hohwy and 
J Kallestrup (eds), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and 
Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 75. 
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ensure the minimal rational coherence and integrity that we expect of 
agents proper.  
 
The claim, then, is that state constitutions often ensure such 
relative state autonomy and minimal diachronic rational coherence and 
integrity by imposing a variety of balances and checks on state decision-
making—for example, separation of powers, federal division of powers, 
judicial review of administrative and legislative action, stare decisis, 
elections, impeachment procedures, and so forth. Depending on how they 
are constituted, discrete institutional state organs pertaining to the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch—sometimes at both federal and 
state, or provincial, levels—can also be imbued with such relatively 
autonomous agency. Commonly-discussed examples include 
municipalities, public corporations, the army, provincial governments, 
various administrative agencies, as well as the executive as a whole.19
 
 
When such suitably-constituted group organizations arrange for moral or 
legal wrongs to be perpetrated, given the decisions they license and the 
constitution by which they channel those decisions, they are fit to be held 
responsible and, possibly, blamed for them qua irreducible ‘source of the 
deed.’  
 Focusing on the state as whole for the sake of simplicity, one may 
interject here that, even if this account is sound in respect of developed 
liberal democratic states, other states may not be sufficiently well 
organized to respond rationally to their environment on a consistent basis 
qua irreducible corporate agents. How should we think of such states? Are 
they states to which a plea of insanity, mental disorder, or straight-out 
non-responsibility should be available against allegations of wrongdoing? 
I am tempted to answer with a qualified yes. To the extent that they do not 
have a sufficiently well-developed constitutional apparatus, or that their 
individual members do not commit to and comply with it enough, such 
states do not qualify as relatively autonomous moral agents capable of 
acting contrary to reason and answering to it. At best, they may be 
                                                 
19 Even if such state organs obviously do not constitute ‘the state’ as a whole, they 
typically form significant parts of it, such that consideration of their agency and possible 
excuses seems to dovetail with a discussion of state excuses. An explanation of the 
precise nature of their connection to ‘the state’—be it legal, conventional, functional, or 
otherwise—is outside the ambit of this chapter. 
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deficiently-constituted ‘quasi-states,’ whose decisions and actions are, in 
general, reducible to the decisions and actions of some of their individual 
members. At worse, they are utterly disorganized ‘failed states’ that 
possess almost none of the characteristics of what we normally conceive 
as states.20
 
  
Here, one may think, lies the main difference with cases of 
individual insanity or mental disorder. Even when mentally-disordered 
individuals are thoroughly incapable of responding to reason, they, unlike 
quasi-states or failed states, remain embodied, identifiable and, in a sense, 
irreducible entities. Some may also argue that, as mentally disordered as 
they may be, human beings are deserving of a kind of respect and dignity 
that is not necessarily warranted, or warranted in the same way, in the case 
of degenerate forms of human organization like failed and quasi-states. 
There is certainly some truth to this line of argument. However, I still 
think the analogy between individual and state insanity can be preserved 
to a meaningful extent if we insist that failed and quasi-states can remain 
identifiable in some respects—say, territorially and in the eyes of certain 
relevant national and international actors—and that, like the mentally 
disordered, they might, in some possible world, be ‘cured’ or re-organized 
in a way that makes state agency possible. For example, it is conceivable 
that, through its own resources and international assistance, the failed state 
of Somalia (as we know it today) could one day develop out of its 
debilitating predicament. Thus circumscribed, the analogy would also 
seem to be applicable to identifiable institutional state organs and other 
sub-state corporate entities that lack irreducible agency, yet are susceptible 
of reorganization that would make it possible.  
 
 Unfortunately, this stretched analogy is only the beginning of our 
troubles. The next and more difficult question is whether a model of 
irreducible state agency such as Pettit’s can be consistent with claims of 
excuses that extend beyond claims of complete lack of responsibility.  
 
                                                 
20 I borrow this distinction from T Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional 
Moral Agents: The Case of States and “Quasi-States”’ in Can Institutions Have 
Responsibilities?: Collective Agency and International Relations (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003) 19, 29-31. 
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2 The Challenge of Affect-Based Excuses with a Cognitive Twist 
 
It is sometimes objected that many common individual excuses are 
grounded in conscious phenomenal experiences such as affective 
experiences and that, since states and corporate state bodies do not have 
such experiences of their own, they simply cannot claim these excuses. 
Consider the excuse of duress, which Andrew Simester, who champions 
this objection, explains in the following terms: 
 
Suppose, for example, that D attacks and seriously injures V 
because T threatens otherwise to kill her. Notwithstanding that it 
was impermissible for D to act as she did, in the sense that there 
were insufficient valid reasons for her conduct, we may be 
reluctant to fault D. Our reluctance is because, although D’s reason 
for acting was (objectively speaking) inadequate, we can 
understand that it was good enough for D. She feared for her life. 
Any reasonable person might have been impelled by such a fear; 
where this is so, we cannot make the inference of culpability that 
would normally entitle us to blame D for her actions. In such cases, 
we may allow for an excuse.21
 
  
This affect-based account of the excuse of duress is generally accepted 
and, arguendo, I shall assume its soundness.22
                                                 
21 Simester, ‘Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law’ (n 3) 299. 
 Simester’s objection is that, 
since corporate organizations such as the state cannot experience the fear 
that is necessary to ground this excuse, it is not available to them. No 
doubt, their individual members can experience the required fear, and may 
 
22 For example, Jeremy Horder writes that ‘All duress cases calling for an excuse have at 
least one ascriptive aspect [...] The great phenomenological strength of D’s fear must 
alter the balance of reasons in D’s mind, so that he or she understandably gives priority to 
saving him- or herself, if need be by committing the wrong in question.’ Horder, 
Excusing Crime (n 14) 58. See also Gardner, Offences and Defences (n 13) 110, 138, 258. 
There are theorists who think that, in the end, all sound excuses—including all forms of 
duress—are grounded in cognitive errors of perception. See eg P Westen, ‘An Attitudinal 
Theory of Excuse’ (2006) 25 L and Philosophy 289. I find such arguments unpersuasive 
given that some people who are perfectly aware of the wrongfulness of their deeds when 
acting under duress may still deserve to be excused if their fear was reasonable and 
sufficient to explain their actions (assuming an acceptable level of self-control).  
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sometimes be excused for their wrongdoing on that basis, but states and 
state bodies qua irreducible corporate agents cannot.  
 
I could not hope to do justice here to the deep and complex 
metaphysical question of whether corporate entities like states and state 
bodies can have affective experiences and other conscious phenomenal 
states of their own. However, some general remarks seem apposite. If 
functionalist thinkers like Pettit are right about corporate agency, then 
given some plausible empirical claims about states—that they have 
decision-making mechanisms, that their decisions can have reasonable 
coherence over time, etc.—there seems to be no principled difficulty in 
ascribing genuine and irreducible cognitive states to them. According to 
such a view, states and other appropriately constituted corporate entities 
can quite literally make judgments, acquire beliefs about what they judge 
to be the case, intend actions, and so forth. However, the case for 
corporate affective states and other phenomenal experiences is more 
difficult to make.  
 
Admittedly, there may be emotions, like anger, that arise among 
group members (who, by hypothesis, are otherwise never angry) when 
they are acting as part of a given group—that is, within the processes and 
relationships that constitute it. This anger might then be described as 
group, or group-related, anger. However, more needs to be said if the 
claim that this anger is irreducible to the anger experienced by individual 
members is to be made out. One could perhaps seek to extend the 
functionalist argument and claim that phenomenal states are also best 
explained functionally. Yet, I find it difficult to imagine how this claim 
could be persuasively developed. As Pettit himself recognizes, 
functionalist claims that corporate entities have emotions that are 
relatively autonomous from those of their individual members are 
generally suspect. It is one thing for states and corporate state institutions 
to be able to form distinct judgments, beliefs, intentions, and other action-
directing attitudes by following, to a reasonable extent, whatever steps are 
prescribed in their constitution. It seems to be quite another for irreducible 
affective states to be generated in a similar way. In other words, there 
seems to be more to phenomenal states—say, to the experience of fear or 
15"
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anger—than mere questions of organizational structure and function.23
 
 
Accordingly, it is at least plausible that Andrew Simester, who appears to 
think that such states are distinctively human (or, at least, animal as 
opposed to artificial), is correct. 
To be sure, some theorists do defend the possibility of irreducibly 
collective emotions. However, their arguments tend to rest on the dubious 
premise that emotions can exist without affective experience. Thus, 
Margaret Gilbert, the most prominent advocate of collective emotions, 
adopts early on in her argument Martha Nussbaum’s claim that some 
emotion-types may have no necessary phenomenal concomitant, citing the 
non-conscious fear of death as an example.24
                                                 
23 P Pettit, ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’ in S Stroud and C Tappolet (eds), 
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 68, 
79. One should be careful when assessing the implications of this proposition. Many 
theorists hold that for an agent to be blameworthy and legitimately blamed this agent 
must be morally responsible in the sense of being able to respond to reasons. Some 
further claim that this ability requires the emotional capacity to be moved by moral 
concerns. It follows, they contend, that affect-less corporate organizations can never be 
blamed legitimately. See especially S Wolf, ‘The Legal and Moral Responsibility of 
Organizations’ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman (eds), Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII 
(New York: New York University Press, 1985) 267. This position rests on an account of 
legitimate blame that we need not accept. Pettit, who implicitly resists it, is in good 
company in this respect: see eg the literature listed in n 13. Alternatively, let us not forget 
that, as Pettit himself recognizes and as I discuss further below, irreducible corporate 
organizations may, derivatively, be moved by the emotions of their constituent members. 
According to Pettit’s account, individual members remain the ones who introduce 
evaluative propositions for group consideration and who, collectively, decide upon them.  
 Besides the fact that the 
existence of non-conscious, non-affective emotional states is highly 
questionable, it is important to note the difference between the claim that 
every emotional state does not necessarily come with a specific and 
distinctive affective experience, and the claim that affect can altogether be 
absent from emotional experience. While the former claim is admittedly 
plausible, the latter is rather more counter-intuitive. It may well be true 
that unlike moods, which refer to purer forms of affective experience—
think of free-floating depression, sadness, elation, or euphoria—emotions 
also have cognitive components, such as being directed at objects and 
 
24 M Gilbert, ‘Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings’ (2002) 6 J of Ethics 115, 
119-120, citing M Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (CUP Cambridge 2001) 61.  
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involving beliefs about them. My fear of a dog, for example, does seem to 
involve a cognitive construal of a number of the dog’s features (its 
salivating maw, its ferocious bark, its running towards me) as frightening. 
However, it does not follow that the relevant cognitive aspects of emotions 
can altogether be devoid of affective experience. Such a position seems 
radically out-of-touch with the phenomenology of emotions, and much 
current research has sought to discredit it.25
 
  
Then again, to the extent that affect-free ‘emotional states’ do exist 
or, following Nussbaum, that some ‘emotions’ are best explained in purely 
cognitive terms—say, as evaluative judgments that ascribe great 
importance to certain things or persons—it seems more accurate to treat 
them generically alongside other cognitive states, rather than as part of a 
distinctive emotional genre. Indeed, insofar as an ‘emotion’ is best 
explained as a mere configuration of beliefs or as a cognitive attitude, I see 
no reason not to label it and treat it as such. To repeat, according to an 
account such as Pettit’s, suitably-constituted states and state institutions 
can have cognitive states (such as beliefs) and action-directing attitudes 
(such as intentions) of their own. It is phenomenal states, such as affective 
states, they cannot experience.26
 
 
Does this view entail that states cannot claim excuses grounded in 
their own affective experiences? The conclusion seems to follow, and 
follow as much in the realm of domestic law as in the realms of 
                                                 
25 See eg M Stocker, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
LC Charland, ‘Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotions: A 
Representational Proposal’ (1997) 64 Philosophy of Science 555; J Pankseep, Affective 
Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P Greenspan, Emotions and 
Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge Chapman and 
Hall, 1988). For an even more radical argument, advocating a close identification of 
emotions with feelings: P Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000).  
 
26 Insofar as conative attitudes such as wishing, desiring, longing, or craving have 
phenomenal components, it may also be that corporate agents cannot have them, or can 
only have them partially. Pro-attitudes devoid of phenomenal components are more 
straightforwardly available to corporate agents. In this respect, intentions and other 
cognitively-defined pro-attitudes are least problematic. I thank Antony Duff for pressing 
me on this point. 
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international law and morality writ large. Note, however, that even if 
states and corporate state institutions cannot claim affect-based excuses—
or, more broadly, excuses grounded in their own phenomenal 
consciousness—they may still be able to claim excuses that are derivative 
from the phenomenal experiences of their individual members. Remember 
that, even if the account of group agency on which I am basing my 
analysis is an account of relatively autonomous group agency, it is still 
individual group members who supply all its matter and energy. So, for 
example, it is a state’s individual members who introduce information and 
option-related evaluative propositions for its consideration. Insofar as the 
information and propositions thus introduced are distorted by, say, the fear 
experienced by the individuals introducing them, state judgments and 
intentions formed on their basis may turn out to be mistaken. Arguably, 
the greater and the more widespread the fear experienced by the 
members—which, in a liberal democracy, may include not only officials, 
but a large part of the citizenry—the likelier it is that their affective 
experience will influence state decision-making and cause corporate 
errors.  
 
Consider, for example, the effect that the deep and widespread fear 
of sudden murderous attacks—which exists amongst important segments 
of Israel’s general population and state officials—might have on state 
decisions. All else being equal, could this fear excuse, at least partially, 
some of Israel’s harshest reactions, as well as some of the unjustified 
reactions of specific governmental and defense institutions, to events that 
do not constitute threats but are collectively perceived as such? All else 
being equal, could the dread of terrorist strikes that prevailed in the US 
after the events of September 11, 2001, at least partially excuse some of 
the state’s legally and morally wrongful and unjustified responses—
including indefinite pre-emptive detentions of both adults and children at 
Guantanamo Bay, official sanction and perpetration of degrading forms of 
treatment as means of interrogation, as well as unwarranted invasive 
military campaigns? At one point in his brief discussion of state excuses, 
Simester seems to open the door to this possibility by qualifying his 
argument, and recognizing that it might just be possible for states to 
invoke epistemic mistakes as excuses for wrongdoing. ‘Epistemic 
mistake,’ he writes, is ‘a quite different type of case.’27
                                                 
27 Simester, ‘Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law’ (n 3) 300.  
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Although Simester does not explain this statement any further, one 
important distinction is readily identifiable. Unlike duress, epistemic 
mistake is a cognition-based, as opposed to an affect-based, ground of 
exculpation. If, indeed, states and corporate state bodies can have 
cognitive abilities, they too may sometimes fall prey to epistemic failures 
and, thus, are vulnerable to making mistakes. Beyond what Simester 
recognizes, they may also fall prey to more radical distortions grounded in 
irresistible ignorance, as well as in other non-belief-based cognitive 
attitudes. Even more importantly for our immediate purposes, though, 
what Simester fails to acknowledge is that the factors that can cause state 
cognitive distortions not only include individual epistemic limitations—
such as misleading or unavailable evidence—and other purely cognitive 
failings, but also phenomenological distortions experienced by individual 
members. In other words, when it comes to states and other irreducible 
corporate agents, cognitive distortions may not always be entirely 
cognitive. For example, affective distortions of the practical rationality of 
individual members may sometimes lie at the root of their corporate 
organization’s cognitive failings. In this sense, it might sometimes be 
possible to speak of states and corporate state institutions that act while 
being ‘blinded by fear’ or ‘blinded by anger’ and then seek to be excused 
on that ground, with the proviso that the fear or anger in question is the 
fear or anger of their individual members. The same could also be said of 
states and state institutions acting in the grip of the (popular) mood of the 
moment.  
 
Of course, this argument does not amount to a claim that Israel, the 
US, or any of their institutions should be excused for their unjustified 
wrongs on the ground of affectively-induced epistemic mistakes. What it 
does, however, is to elucidate further some key intricacies of cognitive 
distortion as a conceivable ground of excuse for them.  
 
3 Some Sui Generis State qua Corporate Excuses? 
 
These last remarks warrant a parenthetical note of methodological caution. 
The analysis as I have conducted it so far assumes that commonly-
encountered individual excuses constitute the standard against which the 
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intelligibility of excusatory claims by group agents should be assessed. In 
other words, my argumentative strategy has so far been to think of excuses 
in terms of commonly-encountered individual excuses—such as duress, 
provocation, and mistake in justification—and ask whether such claims 
are also available to irreducible group agents. Insofar as these agents have 
what it takes to claim such excuses—and they may not, as in the case of 
affective experiences—I see no reason why we should not, at least in 
principle, recognize their possibility (or so I will continue to assume). 
Then again, my remarks at the end of the last section highlight the fact that 
irreducible group agents form a special category of agents. Unlike 
individual agents, their existence and agency depend on, yet are 
irreducible to, the existence and agency of other (individual) agents. 
Doesn’t this constitutional difference warrant a distinct, or perhaps more 
complex, approach to understanding at least some conceivable claims of 
group excuses? I think it might. 
 
What it means for individuals to act appropriately qua ordinary 
individuals may differ from what it means for them to act appropriately 
qua members of a group agent, or so they may think or feel. While full 
commitment of individual members to the group, its constitutional 
operation, as well as its rational coherence and integrity over time, may 
ensure that the group behaves in the fashion of a virtuous agent, various 
members may sometimes be moved, for good or bad reasons, to act in less 
than committed ways. They may, for example, temporarily turn their eyes 
away from the group in order to act fairly, charitably, or humanely qua 
individuals, or because of affective distractions, or simply because of 
selfish or biased inclinations. When this happens, the group may not act in 
the minimally rationally consistent way that we would expect of an agent 
proper.28
 
 Indeed, such lapses may even put the status of the group as an 
irreducible agent in jeopardy. At the same time, notice that they may not 
challenge this status to the same extent as more fundamental structural 
deficiencies may, as we saw, generate failed or quasi-states. 
Consider the case of the United States’ failure to join the League of 
Nations in the 1920s. Although its president at the time, Woodrow Wilson, 
                                                 
28 A minimum of rational coherence and integrity also seems necessary for individual 
human moral agency, even if the required threshold likely falls well short of perfection. 
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led an American charge for the League’s creation and ensured that its 
constitutional covenant—contained in the Treaty of Versailles—would be 
crafted in a way that assumed US membership and leadership, the US 
Senate refused to ratify the treaty and, therefore, to join the organization. 
This senatorial rejection, primarily attributable to the opposition of a 
number of ideologically uncompromising Republican members, sowed the 
seeds for the League’s collapse, which culminated in its inability to 
prevent the Axis Powers’ aggressions that led to World War II.29
 
 Could 
Wilson, acting in the name of the United States, have claimed an excuse 
for his state’s harmful volte-face by invoking the erratic character of the 
US’s dualist system of reception of international treaty law—which 
involves negotiation and signature of treaties by the Executive, and ex post 
facto ratification by Congress? In other words, if a state (or other 
irreducible group agent) is imperfectly organized in a way that facilitates 
rational inconsistency of the sort just exemplified, could such a 
constitutional disorder ground an excuse?  
The question is tantalizing since such organizational deficiencies, 
coupled with individual members’ lapses in commitment to group rational 
integrity, may indeed explain a state’s failure to live up to relevant 
behavioural standards. This kind of explanation may be especially forceful 
in cases, such as the one just described, where the deficient mode of 
organization is inherited from the past and is not easily changed, due to 
constitutional restrictions. Pettit claims that groups that fall prey to such 
momentary, yet radical failures in rational coherence and integrity can 
retain their overall status as irreducible agents. They can do so, he argues, 
insofar as the bulk of their members remain generally disposed to play 
their part in the integration of the group as an agent proper. Such groups 
must also ‘prove capable of acknowledging and denouncing the failure 
and, ideally, reforming their behavior in the future—or if not actually 
achieving reform, at least establishing that the failure is untypical.’30
                                                 
29 See generally JT Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New 
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); RB Henig (ed), The League 
of Nations (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1973). 
 In 
circumstances in which a group meets these conditions, Pettit speaks of 
rational unity of ‘a second-best sort: a unity that can exist in spite of the 
 
30 Pettit, ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’ (n 23) 85. 
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disunity displayed in actual behaviour.’31
 
 In respect of my League of 
Nations example, it could be argued that the volte-face at issue was 
untypical of US behaviour (at the time, at least), and that the US 
subsequently made significant efforts to impress upon other international 
actors that it should generally be trusted to live up to its representations 
and commitments (insofar as it made any). Thus, an exculpatory claim to 
the effect that, given its entrenched constitutional ordering, the US could 
understandably fail to act as a rationally unified agent in circumstances 
like the ones that led to its failure to join the League, is at least 
imaginable. Claims of this sort could also conceivably be made by more 
discrete state institutions acting within the national sphere. 
When, if at all, these claims should be recognized is a further 
question. For what are mostly prudential (or strategic) reasons, 
international law tends to be reluctant to acknowledge states’ internal 
deficiencies as acceptable grounds of exoneration. For example, it is often 
said that such an acknowledgement would inevitably lead to undue erosion 
of international regimes of state responsibility. However, there is no 
absolute moral bar against the invocation of internal deficiencies as 
exculpatory grounds. To return to the analogy with individual defenses for 
a moment, criminal law sometimes recognizes that people who perpetrate 
harmful deeds while having momentarily lost touch with reason might 
legitimately be able to deny responsibility for these deeds, either fully or 
partially. Consider, for example, the oft-encountered defenses of 
automatism and diminished responsibility.  
 
Interestingly, Pettit would likely resist categorizing group claims 
of momentary constitutional disorder that make reliable decision difficult 
as sheer denials of responsibility. He prefers to think of the group failures 
in question in terms of conflicts of ‘inner voices’—that is, the voices of 
different members—that are analogous to conflicts between ‘voices of the 
heart’ and ‘voices of the head’ that give rise to more reasons-based (and 
responsibility-affirming) individual excuses such as normal cases of 
duress and provocation.32
                                                 
31 ibid 82. 
 Of course, this kind of analogy between the 
 
32 On the distinction between denials of responsibility and more reasons-based excuses, 
see Gardner, Offences and Defences (n 13) 131-132; RA Duff, Answering for Crime: 
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excuses-generating ‘inner voices’ of individuals and groups is bound to be 
imperfect. The types of conflicting ‘inner voices’ at play and their role in 
promoting or impeding agency undoubtedly differ significantly as between 
groups and individuals. However, argues Pettit, insofar as we conceive of 
reason as a certain unified sort of pattern, the analogy can be instructive.33
 
 
Notably, it invites us not to overlook the complex role of reason, broadly 
understood with all its cognitive and affective components, in group 
claims such as claims of excuses other than sheer insanity.  
Pettit’s reluctance to analogize too easily cases of group 
constitutional disorder and individual denials of responsibility also has the 
potential to shed contrasting light on the alluring analogy between 
exculpatory pleas of individual infancy and claims that developing states 
and state institutions may make in relation to various developmental 
hiccups. While normal young human infants are only minimally 
responsive to reason, they progressively acquire a more refined 
understanding of themselves and their surroundings as they age. The range 
of actions for which they are basically responsible—in the sense of being 
able to provide rational explanations for them—tends to increase 
correspondingly. Thus, many modern juvenile justice systems 
appropriately strive, with varying degrees of success, to hold children 
responsible only for wrongdoing for which they are basically responsible 
in this sense, and to modulate their remedies and sanctions accordingly.34
 
 I 
say that this approach is appropriate since pleas of human infancy are not 
claims of conflicting ‘inner voices’ in Pettit’s sense, which may be 
amenable to appraisal in light of excusatory standards. They are denials of 
responsibility for alleged wrongdoing (at least in the form in which such 
wrongdoing is alleged).  
                                                                                                                         
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 284-
291. 
 
33 Pettit, ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’ (n 23) 89-93. 
 
34 On the nature and importance of the distinction between ‘being basically responsible’ 
and ‘being held responsible,’ see J Gardner, ‘Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility’ in M 
Kramer, C Grant, B Colburn and A Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart (OUP 
Oxford 2008) 121. 
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States and state institutions may also make exculpatory claims of 
developmental infancy, yet it is not as clear that all such claims are best 
explained as sheer denials of responsibility. Consider, for example, the 
predicament of post-Apartheid South Africa where, within a short period 
of time, a myriad of people of colour who had previously been excluded 
joined the civil service, and started implementing the Interim Constitution. 
Although these new state officials were gradually trained and mentored, 
and their transitional constitutional framework was progressively fleshed 
out, individual inconsistencies and mistakes were initially bound to take 
place, resulting in blunders, slip-ups and, possibly, wrongdoing at the 
corporate level. While, in such a case, it is also the group’s capacity to 
respond appropriately to reason that is at stake, Pettit teaches us that the 
developmental deficiencies in question may not obliterate the group’s 
basically responsible agency, and susceptibility to be held responsible and 
blamed for its wrongful exercise. To repeat, there remains for Pettit a 
‘second-best’ sense of unified, irreducible corporate agency which, in the 
face of teething problems, rests on the group’s members persistent and 
general commitment to its integration as an irreducibly constituted agent, 
as well as on the group’s ex post reaffirmation and readjustment of this 
integration. Thus, unlike in cases of individual human infancy, corporate 
bodies that are initially unable to respond to reason appropriately due to 
developmental hiccups might still at times appropriately be held 
responsible and blamed for related wrongdoing.35 Then again, it is also 
conceivable that these groups’ blameworthiness—like the 
blameworthiness of older, more established groups struggling with 
constitutional disorders—may sometimes be mitigated, when relevant 
excusatory standards of institutional resilience, due diligence, as well as ex 
post facto denunciation are met.36
                                                 
35 Note, however, Pettit’s subsidiary and fiction-based ‘developmental rationale’ for 
holding both children and ‘embryonic group agents’ responsible and punishing them in 
some way for harm to which they are merely causally related: it incentivizes them to pull 
themselves together so as to avoid such harm in the future. Pettit, ‘Responsibility 
Incorporated’ (n 17) 198-201.  
  
 
36 This point finds reflection in discussions of how the existence of effective “compliance 
programs” in private corporations may affect how blameworthy they are, and how much 
they should be punished, for criminal wrongdoing. On this related question: C Gómez-
Jara Díez, ‘Corporate Culpability as a Limit to the Overcriminalization of Corporate 
Criminal Liability: The Interplay Between Self-Regulation, Corporate Compliance, and 
Corporate Citizenship’ (2011) 14 New Crim L Rev 78.  
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Here, I am not denying that some states and state institutions with 
infant, frail, or limited decision-making structures may sometimes be 
basically responsible for some specific actions, while not being basically 
responsible for others.37
 
 Indeed, such teetering reality may be especially 
frequent in infant states with constitutional deficiencies that exceed the 
mere inability to train officials adequately. In large part, this is because 
constitutional structures including agency-enabling balances and checks 
such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, parliamentary 
democracy, and judicial review take time to develop. As it were, France 
and the United Kingdom did not emerge from the state of nature 
overnight, and were likely non-responsible for many harms associated 
with their evolution. My goal here is simply to point out that there is 
almost certainly more to the corporate agency story than this, and that the 
possibility of sui generis corporate excuses, differing from common 
individual excuses, should not be overlooked. At the same time, the 
complex nature of these sui generis claims and the magnitude of the 
philosophical apparatus that would be needed to elucidate them fully 
prevent me from saying any more here, for fear of losing sight of my 
initial goal of mapping out the many theoretical puzzles related to state 
excuses. Then again, I think have said enough to build at least a prima 
facie case for the intelligibility of group claims of excuses on the ground 
of constitutional disorder (short of sheer non-responsibility). I would ask 
readers to keep this possibility in mind when thinking about the 
constellation of excusatory claims that may be available to irreducible 
group agents. 
4 The Lack of Valuable Self-Interest Objection to State Excuses 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
37 The categories of ‘quasi-states’ and ‘weak institutions’ are sometimes used to reflect 
this possibility. On this point, see T Erskine, ‘Kicking Bodies and Damning Souls: The 
Danger of Harming “Innocent” Individuals While Punishing “Delinquent” States’ (2010) 
24 Ethics & Intl Affairs 261, 268. As NW Barber argues based on the work of WR Bion 
in Experiences in Groups (London: Routledge, 1989), constitutional weaknesses can also 
be exacerbated by various state ‘neuroses,’ such as excessive reliance on a leader 
(totalitarian or not) and undue fixation on a perceived threat as a source of group 
identification and unification. Barber, The Constitutional State (n 1) 117-123.    
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Another prominent set of objections to the possibility of state qua 
corporate excuses has both metaphysical and moral aspects, which tend to 
be run together in argument. According to it, even if we grant that states 
have much of what it takes to make excuses—for example, that they are 
normally rational agents that can make errors in cognition and perhaps 
even undergo some forms of affective experiences—we should still never 
recognize their excusatory claims. The general thought is that corporate 
agents like states are purely instrumental creations that have no real 
interests or subjective values of their own. Insofar as they do—after all, 
the paradigm of corporate agency explored allows for irreducible group 
judgments and attitudes about what matters to the group’s survival and 
what is important to the realization its constitutional goals—then such 
group self-interest and values should never be given weight in law or 
morality more generally. Corporate agents exist, or should exist, 
exclusively to promote the interests and values of others—that is, of non-
instrumental agents like human beings. Therefore, the objection holds, no 
recognition should ever be given to their self-interested excusatory claims. 
No matter what affective pressures they incur, or what mistakes they 
commit, states and state institutions should never be excused for 
wrongfully privileging themselves. Nor should they be excused for any 
tendency they may have to do so. For example, they should never be 
excused under the heading of duress for acting wrongfully due to what 
were perceived as overbearing threats to their interests or subjective 
values.38
 
  
In my view, the apparent strength of this line of argument comes 
primarily from its close affinity with the principle of value individualism, 
according to which the worth of the state (and, indeed, of anything else) 
must ultimately be appreciated in terms of its contribution to human life 
and its quality. If, indeed, it is only human interests and values that matter 
(here, some allowance may also be made for interests of other non-human 
                                                 
38 The excuse of duress tends to be explained in terms of self-interest. For example, 
Jeremy Horder writes that ‘The agent-specific character of reasons for action in duress is 
associated with the centrality of the fact that the threat confronts the defendant with 
having to make a personal sacrifice, or commit wrongdoing.’ The personal sacrifice in 
question, he adds, can be any significant sacrifice of ‘self-interest’ or, more broadly, of 
‘one’s cherished values.’ J Horder, ‘Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding 
the Relationship’ (1998) 11 Canadian J of L and Jurisprudence 143, 161. 
!
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conscious beings), then there seems to be no residual moral space for the 
recognition of the so-called interests or subjective values of irreducible 
corporate agents. One possible rejoinder might be that value individualism 
does not necessarily commit one to a purely instrumentalist view of 
corporate agency. If one could demonstrate that  corporate agents like 
states or state institutions are intrinsically valuable as necessary 
constituents of goods that intrinsically enrich human life, then some 
limited recognition and protection of ‘their interests’—or of their natural 
tendency to protect their interests—could, perhaps, be warranted (for 
example, in the form of excusatory concessions for state wrongdoing). 
Some have recently mounted spirited arguments in favour of the existence 
and value of groups’ irreducible interests along such lines, and it may be 
that they are onto something.39 However, powerful objections—
questioning the metaphysical soundness of such arguments and the 
acceptability of their possible moral implications—continue to dominate 
current debates, and invite great theoretical caution.40
 
  
                                                 
39 In a number of famous essays, Charles Taylor sets the stage for a rejoinder of the type 
outlined in the text, positing that some intrinsically valuable common goods may 
necessarily implicate the state. See eg C Taylor, ‘Atomism’ in Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985); C Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’ in NL 
Rosenblum (ed), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1989) 159. However, Taylor himself stops short of speaking of valuable state self-
interest. For a recent argument going all the way and defending the existence and value of 
‘non-aggregative collective interests,’ see DG Newman, ‘Collective Interests and 
Collective Rights’ (2004) 49 American J of Jurisprudence 127. See also J Waldron, ‘The 
Dignity of Groups’ in J Barnard-Naudé, D Cornell & F du Bois (eds), Acta Juridica 2008 
(Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2009) 66. 
 
40 See eg Will Kymlicka’s forceful counter-argument to Taylor’s view of common goods 
in W Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). See also M Dan-Cohen, ‘Sanctioning Corporations’ (2010) 19 J of L and Policy 
15. Dan-Cohen’s premise is that all deontological constraints on practices of blame and 
punishment are grounded in ‘human dignity.’ While this premise is questionable on both 
conceptual and moral grounds, his overall point that the justification of these practices 
has to be rethought in light of the primarily instrumental value of corporations must be 
taken seriously. On the general need for theoretical caution in this area, see further D 
Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 143-144.   
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What is perhaps a less metaphysically doubtful and morally 
hazardous way of challenging the interest objection to corporate excuses is 
to cast doubt on another assumption that underlies it. I am referring here to 
the assumption that claims of excuses can be reduced to calls for moral or 
legal leniency for agents who wrongfully, though understandably, 
disregard the interests of others in order to protect their own. I believe that 
this assumption is unwarranted. It is simply untrue that valid excuses can 
only arise in the context of dilemmas between self-interest and the 
interests of others, where the wrongdoer is deemed to have stricken a 
balance between the two that is sufficiently virtuous to block or attenuate 
inferences of blame. Many excuses have nothing to do with self-interest, 
so that the question of whether or not corporate entities like states and 
state bodies have interests of their own is often quite irrelevant to their 
ability to make such claims legitimately.  
 
It is true that some claims of excuses, such as those relying on 
sufficient display of courage in the face of coercive threats, may be 
connected to questions of self-interest. As Aristotle once dramatized it, 
using the example of the citizen who risks being killed on the battlefield 
for the sake of his homeland, courage is a virtue of character that tends to 
arise out of a struggle between personal safety and external considerations, 
such as collective victory.41
                                                 
41 On courage generally and on Aristotle’s understanding of it, see D Pears, ‘The 
Anatomy of Courage’ (2004) 71 Social Research 1. 
 However, not all displays of virtue that may 
yield legitimate claims of excuses have the same structure. For example, 
loyalty, which the state may invoke in a bid to excuse wrongfully 
favouring citizens over non-citizens, is a virtue that, at its core, is other-
regarding. In my view, a theory of morality that would only account for 
dilemmas between the pursuit of self-interest and the pursuit of the 
interests of others, exclusively allowing for excuses in such contexts, 
would be radically deficient. As the example of loyalty highlights, 
dilemmas of moral life can also arise between different ways of engaging 
with pursuits that have others’ valuable interests at their heart, and valid 
claims of excuses might well be made in such contexts as well. Moreover, 
some claims of excuses have very little, if anything, to do with questions 
of interests writ large. Think, for example, of claims of epistemic mistake, 
constitutional disorder, or claims more akin to full or partial denials of 
!
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responsibility (insofar as they are appropriately categorized as excuses). 
Thus, even if one concedes that states, like other corporate bodies, have no 
valuable interests of their own, state excuses must not necessarily be ruled 
out as a possibility. The range of available grounds of state excuses may 
then differ from the range of available grounds of individual excuses, as 
may the range of available grounds of corporate excuses in general, but 
this should not be taken to mean that states, or other irreducible corporate 
entities, may never make valid excuses. 
 
5 Questioning the Irreducible Corporate Agency Model and Related-
Excusatory Claims 
 
A more sweeping moral objection to state excuses, understood as excuses 
claimed by states or state institutions qua irreducible corporate agents, 
denies the very necessity for such excuses in the first place. Such excuses 
are thought to be unnecessary since practices consisting in holding 
corporate agents responsible for wrongdoing and, say, blaming and 
punishing them for it, are morally redundant. According to this line of 
objection, both the moral and legal regulation of human actions, be they 
individual or collective, and practices of accountability for wrongdoing 
can and should be articulated in exclusively individualistic terms. That is, 
insofar as we understand grounds and practices of moral and legal 
accountability for wrongdoing in suitably complex and nuanced ways—
allowing for sufficiently broad accounts of complicitous and joint 
wrongdoing—the possibility of holding irreducible groups responsible, 
blaming them, and punishing them really becomes superfluous.42
 
 Thus, 
the question of whether irreducible group agents can invoke excuses turns 
out to be moot.  
 One possible rejoinder is as follows: an account of irreducible 
group agency like Pettit’s has the advantage of providing a distinct ground 
for holding groups such as states and their corporate institutions 
responsible and blaming them—say, because their actions made harm 
likely or inevitable—at times when no similar ground is available for 
                                                 
42 Christopher Kutz’s argument seems at least partly animated by this idea in his 
Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) and ‘Causeless Complicity’ (2007) 1 Crim L and Philosophy 289. 
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holding individual contributors responsible and blaming them. This kind 
of shortfall of individual responsibility may arise when, for example, 
individual contributors to state action avoid being held responsible and 
blamed for their deeds owing to reasonable mistakes or ignorance, due 
care, duress, or other relevant excuses. Practices of state qua irreducible 
group responsibility may guard against such scenarios, as well as diminish 
the incentive for people to arrange things so as to increase their likelihood.  
 
 Here, one may be tempted to retort that, even if this rejoinder is 
sound, it is nevertheless self-defeating. Indeed, if the state can be excused 
for its wrongs when its individual members are excused for their own 
wrongful contributions, aren’t shortfalls of responsibility unavoidable? I 
believe that this worry is largely unwarranted. First, excusable individual 
contributions to state action do not necessarily entail excusable state 
behaviour, and vice-versa. For example, it is not because specific 
individual state members act mistakenly or under duress that their state or 
corporate state institution will necessarily act mistakenly. Multiple checks 
and balances are typically in place to reduce the likelihood of the former 
automatically translating into the latter. Grounds of responsibility may 
also be different for the state and its members, such that the excuses of one 
may have nothing to do with the wrongs of the other.  
 
What is more, in respect of reasons-based excuses such as 
epistemic mistake or normal cases of duress or provocation, role-based 
considerations must also be factored in. In law as in morality, excusatory 
standards often vary according to the roles played by those who claim 
excuses.43
                                                 
"#!See generally Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ in Offences and Defences (n 13) 121-139, 
as well as his ‘Reply to Critics’ 245.  
 Thus, the standards of excusability applicable to individual state 
officials, although possibly more stringent than the standards applicable to 
ordinary people, may be nowhere near as stringent as the standards 
applicable to given corporate state institutions or, perhaps even more 
strikingly, to the state in all its grandeur. States are typically designed and 
built to be outstandingly strong and knowledgeable, in order to solve 
social problems that individuals and smaller corporate entities acting in 
uncoordinated ways are unable to solve—such as the securing of social 
order, safety, trust, and the conditions of societal cooperation. They tend 
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to have access to multiple and often better sources of information than 
other social actors (including their members taken individually). They also 
tend to have greater resources, authority over many more people, and 
more extensive opportunities for contingency planning and training than 
other agents. With such attributes come greater responsibilities and greater 
(arguably, much greater) expectations of virtue, skill, and reasonableness. 
Insofar as the idea of capacity to do otherwise matters to some excuses, 
different standards may also be applicable to states and their individual 
members in this regard.44
 
 Therefore, even in situations where all 
individual state members are excused for their contributions to state 
wrongdoing, the state and its institutions may well not be. Of course, the 
possibility of a shortfall of responsibility always remains. However, if I 
am correct, such shortfalls are likely to be rare. 
 Now, it might also be possible to resist the shortfall of 
responsibility argument at a more general level by arguing that the 
exonerating force of epistemic limitations and other types of pressures 
inherent in organizational settings is less significant than has traditionally 
been believed. One salient reason for this skepticism is as follows: insofar 
as individuals know—or, perhaps, ought to know—that they are 
participating in the operation of a group decisional framework that may, 
by its very constitutional design, yield bad or harmful outputs, it is 
questionable whether they should ever be able to escape consequential 
responsibility by invoking the irreducibility of these outputs. 
Alternatively, it may be that these individuals should only ever be entitled 
to partial excuses that mitigate their blameworthiness for wrongful 
participation in collective harm, as opposed to negating it altogether.45
                                                 
44 cf Horder, Excusing Crime (n 14) chs 3-4. 
 Of 
course, this analysis also leaves open the possibility that there may be 
scenarios in which the conduct of no individual contributor to harmful 
state action quite amounts to wrongdoing, or only amounts to relatively 
insignificant wrongdoing. Yet, if the line of argument just outlined is 
sound, the shortfall of individual responsibility argument may not provide 
 
45 Jeff McMahan makes a forceful argument along such lines in relation to individual 
soldiers’ decisions to fight in unjust wars in Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 137-154. 
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as forceful a case for holding irreducible group agents responsible as some 
think it does.  
 
Furthermore, even insofar as the shortfall of responsibility 
argument provides a compelling case for group responsibility, including 
the possibility of blame and its cognates, some skeptical minds may still 
object. They may object that, on any plausible account, conditions for 
irreducible group responsibility will be so demanding that many states and 
state institutions such as courts, legislatures, ministerial cabinets, and 
administrative agencies are unlikely to meet them, or to meet them on any 
consistent basis. It cannot simply be assumed, they might insist, that states 
and their institutions are agents capable of being held responsible and 
blamed in an irreducible sense, like Pettit and others sometimes seem 
inclined to do. More radically, some might also advance objections to the 
very metaphysical possibility of irreducible group agency and 
responsibility, and simply reject accounts such as Pettit’s as misguided.  
 
At this point, one should be careful not to throw the baby with the 
bath water. If, indeed, the shortfall of individual responsibility argument is 
a valid one, as I think it at least sometimes is, then there will likely remain 
considerable pressures—grounded in reasons of deterrence, justice, 
expressiveness and symbolism, as well as various other pragmatic 
concerns—for practices of group accountability for collectively facilitated 
harm that cannot be blamed, in whole or in part, on individual 
wrongdoers. Thus, there may sometimes be good reasons to treat the 
state—even if only understood as a socio-legal or functional grouping 
without irreducible moral agency—as if it could intelligibly and 
legitimately be held responsible, blamed, and perhaps even punished, like 
a fully-fledged responsible agent. In other words, we may sometimes be 
justified in erecting fictions (or, more loosely put, figurative accounts) of 
state responsibility and blameworthiness. This may be the case when, for 
example, such holdings would have significant expressive value—think of 
situations in which there is mass popular support for, or acquiescence to, 
unjustified official wrongdoing. Such fictions may also lead to critical 
reforms in state members’ behaviour and contribute to forestalling future 
misconduct. Such a consequentialist way of thinking about state 
responsibility for wrongdoing could conceivably complement, or perhaps 
even replace, more robust models such as Pettit’s. Therefore, we must also 
 "
32                                         
 
spend some time analyzing the implications of this second paradigm for 
the possibility of state excuses. 
 
C. FROM REALISM TO PRAGMATIC FICTION 
 
1 The General Problem 
 
In both law and morality, groups are sometimes treated as agents even 
when they are not, and held responsible, blamed, and punished for conduct 
and outcomes that are only fictionally ‘theirs.’46 A case in point is that of 
regimes of corporate criminal liability which rely on doctrines of 
identification or vicarious responsibility to hold corporations accountable 
and blame them for some of the wrongs and harms perpetrated by their 
members, either individually, aggregatively, or jointly. Many such regimes 
are premised on the imputation to the corporation of a package, 
comprising some designated individuals’ conduct (including their acts and 
mental states), that amounts, or is relevantly related to, wrongdoing. Other 
such regimes involve the sheer attribution of individuals’ blameworthiness 
to the corporation.47
 
 The question for us is this: insofar as the imputed 
conduct or blameworthiness is that of individual human beings who are at 
least partially excused for their own deeds, can their individual excuses 
ever limit or affect that for which the corporation can legitimately be 
blamed and punished?  
 Indeed, the structure of regimes like the ones just mentioned does 
not necessarily preclude the concurrent imputation to the group of related 
individual excuses—with all their components, be they cognitive, 
                                                 
46 The most comprehensive discussion of legal fictions remains L Fuller, Legal Fictions 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967). Moral fictions are the subject of an entire 
school of moral theory often referred to as ‘fictionalism.’ While many of the questions 
addressed in the moral fictionalism debate are deeper and only indirectly related to the 
topic addressed here, a useful overview can be found in M Eklund, ‘Fictionalism’, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring edn, 2009) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/fictionalism/>. See also J Feinberg, 
‘Collective Responsibility’ (1968) 65 J of Philosophy 674, who treats collective 
responsibility as an inherently vicarious form of responsibility. 
 
47 For a good survey, see Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (n 12) 148-158. See 
also H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2006) 96-109. 
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affective, etc. Insofar as state institutions such as local governments or 
other public bodies are targets of moral blame or criminal liability in this 
imputed way, such a structural observation also seems to apply. So does it 
to cases in which the state as a whole may, in similar ways, be blamed and 
threatened with sanctions, be it in the context of constitutional law, 
international law, or morality more generally. That is, the excusatory 
claims of individuals whose conduct or alleged blameworthiness is at 
stake may conceivably also be imputed to the state and its institutions by 
means of fictions.  
 
But should individual excuses be imputed to groups in such ways? 
As I indicated at the end of the last section, theorists who think of 
collective responsibility, collective blame, and collective punishment as 
fictions tend to justify associated practices in pragmatic terms. Christopher 
Kutz, for example, argues that such practices can be justified as means of 
changing collective behaviour for the better, or as means of expressing 
symbolically more significant criticism for the joint perpetration of harm 
(than if criticism was solely aimed at individual contributors).48 Now, 
insofar as the attribution of individual excuses to a group can at least 
partially exonerate it and, consequently, pre-empt the realization of such 
valuable reformative and symbolic ends, it is easy to see why pragmatist 
theorists are reluctant to admit that such attribution is ever warranted.49
 
 
Attribution of individual excuses to groups, their thought goes, would 
threaten to undermine the very rationale for blaming and punishing them 
for the acts of individuals.  
 The mistake that should not be made here is to assume that the 
reasons invoked to justify blaming and punishing groups by means of 
fictions always trump countervailing reasons. Admittedly, there will at 
times be strong reasons in favour of group accountability, group blame, 
and even group punishment for harmful wrongdoing. However, there may 
also be significant competing reasons that can defeat these strong reasons. 
                                                 
 
48 Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (n 42) 191-197. Note that the 
idea of shortfall of individual responsibility tends to underlie discussions of justifications 
of the second kind.   
 
49 Thus, in ibid 3, Kutz speaks about pleas for excuse in primarily individualistic terms. 
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For example, blaming and punishing groups may stigmatize innocent 
individual members and cause them to suffer unfairly. The problem of 
unfair dispersion of group blame and punishment has plagued theorists of 
collective responsibility for years, and there does not seem to be any easy 
cure. To be sure, some think that, in light of the seriousness of the 
problem, we should simply refrain from blaming and punishing groups—
and perhaps especially large and complex groupings like states and state 
institutions.50 Then again, justice—and, more broadly, morality—may not 
demand such a radical conclusion, and attribution to groups of relevant 
excuses, in tandem with wrongdoing, might form part of a more nuanced 
position that gives due consideration to reasons for blaming and punishing 
groups as well as to reasons against it, such as unfair dispersion concerns. 
Attribution of individual excuses to groups may also serve important 
expressive ends. For example, it may provide a meaningful 
acknowledgement that, in certain circumstances, there are duties which 
individual group members should not be blamed, or should not suffer, for 
failing to discharge either on their own or together. What is more, 
imputation of excuses to groups might matter outside the context of 
straightforward blame and punishment. At times, such imputation may 
suitably mitigate crippling compensatory obligations that befall group 
members for the erratic and generally detrimental conduct of a few 
individuals acting, in the group’s name, under, say, duress or epistemic 
misapprehensions.51
                                                 
50 See eg DF Thompson, ‘Criminal Responsibility in Government’ in JR Pennock and JW 
Chapman (eds), Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII (New York: New York University Press, 
1985) 201, 212-213. At 224, Thompson adds that ‘the problem of dispersion of 
punishment is even more serious in government than in other organizations. Not only 
does the punishment fall on citizens who, like shareholders or employees of corporations, 
had nothing to do with the crime and may not be able to do anything about similar crimes 
in the future, but it also often falls most heavily on those citizens who have the least 
opportunity to do anything about such crimes.’ 
 Or in the case of the declaration of an unjust war, 
attribution of excuses to the declaring state may modulate its members’ 
overall liability to harmful self-defensive action. Of course, all these 
 
51 Such mitigation may be especially important when the target group does not have the 
organizational capacity to redistribute the costs appropriately between group members. 
On this point, see A Pasternak, ‘The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment’ in T 
Isaacs and R Vernon (eds), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 210, 230. 
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claims are controversial and arguments beyond what I can provide here 
would be needed to vindicate them, insofar as they can be. That said, I 
offer them as plausible candidates of areas in which fictions of group 
excuses may play an important role and as provocations for further 
theoretical scrutiny. 
 
One of the fiercest opponents of (legal) fictions, Jeremy Bentham, 
used to deride them as ‘lies’ that ‘may be applied to a good purpose, as 
well as to a bad one: in giving support to a useful rule or institution, as 
well as to a pernicious one.’52
 
 For Bentham, the only appropriate response 
to this ambivalent and rather unpredictable character of fictions was to get 
rid of them altogether. However, since fictions of group responsibility can 
serve important ends, this remedy seems drastic. A more discerning 
position may be to insist that such fictions must always be justified, in the 
sense of being deployed for undefeated reasons. As suggested above, it is 
at least plausible that imputation of individual excuses to groups, 
alongside other elements comprised in the package imputed to them 
through doctrines of identification or vicarious responsibility, might on 
occasion help ensure that practices of group—and, more to the point, 
state—blame, punishment, and their cognates remain so justified. 
The point also applies if groups such as states can be irreducible 
agents and one asks whether the emotions, moods, interests, and the like, 
of their individual members may ever be imputed to them by means of 
fiction—in ways that could contribute to grounding claims of group 
excuses. Here again, the issue is one of justification. Yet, in the case of the 
state, many are reluctant to concede even   the very possibility of such 
justified fictions given what they perceive as the slipperiness of the 
concession. The state is a purely instrumental creature, they claim, and 
given its role and position in society, it should embody the epitome of 
knowledgeability, self-control, and fortitude. As I claimed in the last 
section, there is certainly some truth to this suggestion. But should 
states—however we understand them—really always be held to standards 
of perfection in reasonableness, skill, and virtue, such that any talk of state 
excuses and related talk of state emotions, moods, and interests are really 
                                                 
52 J Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol VII (J Bowring ed, Edinburgh: William 
Tait, 1843) 287. 
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moot ab initio? Throughout this chapter, I hinted in various ways at my 
discomfort with this radical suggestion. In the next section, I, at last, tackle 
upfront its most prominent incarnation. 
 
2 The State as an Inexcusable Beacon of Virtue?  
 
A challenging group of objections take aim at the suggestion that states 
may legitimately be afforded excuses in situations where their ‘special 
relationship’ with, and instrumental value to, their human subjects are at 
issue. The thought seems to be that, given the nature of the state as an 
entity whose every function and action should be instrumentally tailored to 
the well-being of its subjects, such situations are a common place. They 
are a common place and give rise to expectations of state virtue that are so 
exacting as to create a virtually insurmountable barrier to the legitimate 
recognition of state excuses. These objections primarily take issue with the 
possibility of domestic state excuses, understood either according to the 
irreducibility paradigm or the fiction paradigm, given the deep and 
inevitable interplay between a state’s actions and its subjects at the 
domestic level. Still, international variants are also conceivable. 
 
 A first such objection rests on the fact that not only does the 
modern state typically have great resources and opportunities for action, it 
also characteristically claims a preeminent social role for itself as wielder 
of supreme and legitimate authority over a territory and its occupants. The 
objection is that, given such attributes, the state should not only seek to be, 
but be expected to be, a model of virtue for all those who live under it, 
work on its behalf, or otherwise relevantly cross its path. Indeed, what 
standing would it have to guide them, hold them responsible, and 
sometimes even blame and punish them were it not to live up to what it 
preaches and more? Besides, wouldn’t excusing the state for unjustified 
wrongdoing risk creating erroneous perceptions amongst individual state 
officials and ordinary subjects that no more is actually expected of them? 
Such moral concerns, and there are no doubt many related others, are 
undoubtedly deserving of serious consideration. For some, though, they 
are so salient as to require holding the state to a standard of virtuous 
perfection in its dealings with its subjects. In such contexts, the thought 
goes, even if states can face exigent circumstances and, say, undergo 
debilitating affective experiences—real or fictionally attributed—they 
must always be expected to tower above them, with complete 
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equanimity.53
 
 Therefore, there ought to be no excusatory concessions to 
state frailty.  
 Simester emphasizes a distinct, yet related objection, when he 
argues that ‘it is not open for the State, or its officials, to prefer the 
interests of one person to another, since the State is not entitled to be 
closer to one person than another. It is equidistant, impartial to all.’54
 
 
Here, the underlying assumption seems to be that, insofar as states have 
valuable interests and personal values, they are expected never to act on 
them in their relationships with their subjects. Insofar as they do not have 
such interests and values, yet one embraces a conception of morality that 
admits of primarily other-regarding dilemmas, such as dilemmas of 
loyalty, states are also expected to refrain from engaging in them, once 
again in the context of their relationships with their subjects. Accordingly, 
even if valid excuses may sometimes be available to individual 
wrongdoers in relevantly similar circumstances, such excuses should 
never be recognized when invoked by or in the name of the state.  
 Part of the apparent strength of this last objection derives, in my 
view, from the powerful liberal idea that states should administer justice 
impartially and impersonally. Were states not to behave in this way, 
liberals argue, the very idea of state justice would be severely undermined. 
I am sympathetic to this position, which I take to be quite uncontroversial. 
However, the administration of justice does not exhaust the activities of 
the modern state. States also seek to thwart the spread of diseases and risks 
of natural disasters, they make administrative decisions in matters of 
taxation, immigration, healthcare and national security, they wage war and 
engage in all sorts of other pursuits that are not strictly tied to the 
administration of justice. In the context of these further pursuits, could it 
not sometimes be excusable for states, state institutions, as well as 
officials acting in their name and behalf to be partial on account of 
relevant allegiances? For example, whereas it may be morally wrong, all 
things considered, to expel illegal immigrants who have resided and 
integrated in a state, as well as contributed to it for a long time, is it really 
                                                 
53 This objection was first suggested to me, in spirit, by John Gardner. 
 
54 Simester, ‘Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law’ (n 3) 302. 
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always inexcusable for the state to proceed given significant popular and 
political pressures stemming from the citizenry?  
 
Some, like Simester, seem to believe that state partiality is 
indefensible at the domestic level, and that states should be expected to 
adopt a perfectly impartial and impersonal standpoint in their dealings 
with their subjects (or, at least, their citizens). Some strict cosmopolitan 
moral theorists endorse an even more far-reaching version of this view, 
arguing for stringent duties of justice, respect, and beneficence owed to all 
human beings regardless of territorial jurisdiction, social ties, and political 
affiliations. These are theorists for whom the objection to state excuses 
considered here would likely extend to key international dimensions of 
states’ conduct, such as those impinging on the human rights of people 
who are outside their jurisdiction and are not their subjects. For example, 
such theorists would likely resist the grant of any excuses to states 
declaring unjust wars to protect their citizens. This position stands in stark 
contrast with that of various particularist and pluralist communitarians of 
various stripes who readily reject as unrealistic and unreasonable any such 
premise of perfect state impartiality.55
 
  
Who is right? I do not intend to delve at length into this last 
debate, nor into the issue of which precise standards of virtue should apply 
to states. My intention is rather to draw the reader’s attention to an oft-
neglected, yet plausible defense of official public attitudes which, despite 
being conducive to partiality and lesser equanimity, may be consistent 
with a proper, instrumental account of the role and value of the state. 
Opponents of state excuses who insist on state impartiality and virtuous 
perfection at all times, tend to overlook the strength of such arguments. 
 
 Consider the gap that sometimes exists, at both state and non-state 
levels, between what I will call the morality of motives and the morality of 
actions. For example, take the case of the army officer whose hot-
headedness sometimes leads her to be less than impartial, treat many of 
                                                 
55 For a thought-provoking discussion of the tension between these two kinds of outlooks, 
see R Rao, Third World Protest: Between Home and the World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). On the specific question of excuses and reasonable partiality in 
the context of war, see S Lazar, ‘The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A 
Review Essay’ (2010) 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 180, 197-198. 
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her subordinates harshly, and deal with enemy combatants mercilessly. All 
things considered, her hot-headed actions may not always be justified. 
However, for army officers in many important roles, such hot-headedness 
is a morally desirable attitude. For example, we would not want them to be 
such coldfish that they are unable to motivate their troops. Hot-headedness 
might also be a condition of their success in battle. In other words, hot-
headedness may be instrumental to the realization of some of the 
legitimate state purposes that army officers exist to serve qua officials 
whose conduct is imputable to the state. I believe that this point also holds 
with respect to a wide-range of individual and, possibly, irreducible 
corporate attitudes that are crucial to the fulfilment of state functions, yet 
can sometimes drive a wedge between morally acceptable thinking about 
actions and morally acceptable actions. Think of risk-averseness, 
carefulness in planning, dedication to people’s welfare and responsiveness 
to their needs, efficiency-mindedness, and so forth.  
 
Conflicts between morally desirable attitudes and right action are a 
recurring feature of moral life for both ordinary individuals and states. As 
Robert Merrihew Adams pointedly remarks, such conflicts can often be 
tragic: 
 
Are there some circumstances in which it is best, for example, in 
the true morality of motives, to be unable to bring oneself to 
sacrifice the happiness of a friend when an important duty obliges 
one, in the true morality of actions, to do so? I don’t know. But if 
there are, the interests involved, on both sides, are far from trivial, 
and the seriousness of both moralities can be maintained. If one 
fails to perform an important duty, one ought, seriously, to feel 
guilty; but one could not do one’s duty in such a case without 
having a motivation of which one ought, seriously, to be ashamed. 
The situation presents a tragic inevitability of moral disgrace.56
  
 
I take part of the point of the previous passage to be that some breaches of 
duty—that is, some wrongs—may not be justified, all things considered, 
even when perpetrated out of friendship. However, in some contexts, the 
willingness to stand up for a friend even in the face of conflicting duty 
                                                 
56 R Merrihew Adams, ‘Motive Utilitarianism’ (1976) 73 J of Philosophy 467, 478.  
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may still be reasonable. If not necessarily admirable, it may well be 
understandable. Common claims of excuses take hold in such instances of 
wrongdoing that stem from understandable motivations.57
 
 When 
appropriate standards of virtue are met, such claims may well be 
legitimately recognized. Insofar as they are grounded in motivations that 
are instrumental to legitimate state functions, they may also be 
appropriately imputed to the state in tandem with other aspects of 
individual behaviour with which it is identified. Of course, if states and 
state institutions do not have personal values, interests, or conscious 
phenomenal experiences of their own qua irreducible group agents, not all 
types of motivations that may lead to valid individual excuses may be 
available to them under that specific understanding of state responsibility. 
Yet, at the very least, it seems to me that states and state institutions so 
understood may have reasonable cognitive attitudes or inclinations that are 
defensible as instrumental to their proper functions. Such attitudes may 
play a significant part in shaping their motivations for action and, 
sometimes, open the door to valid claims of state excuses for wrongdoing.  
 Again, I am not denying that many excusatory standards to be 
applied to states and state institutions qua irreducible agents, or to officials 
whose conduct is imputed to the state, should, as a matter of course, be 
demanding. This conclusion seems to follow from the special social 
position of the state vis-à-vis its subjects and its typically greater 
resources, authority, and general opportunities for action. Yet, I remain 
unconvinced that such features necessarily translate into excusatory 
standards of virtuous perfection for states and that, unlike for individuals, 
no excusatory recognition should ever be given to their understandable 
distortions in judgment, either at the domestic or international level. After 
all, states are collectives of individuals and, therefore, it seems that our 
expectations of them must at least partly depend on expectations that we 
have of these individuals acting together.   
 
                                                 
57 This is one of a number of important insights to be found in C Finkelstein, ‘Excuses 
and Dispositions in Criminal Law’ (2002) 6 Buffalo Crim L Rev 317. Unfortunately, the 
holistic consequentialist conception of excuses that she elaborates is, in my view, 
excessively thin, narrow, and unqualified. 
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To be sure, it seems to me that we could plausibly conceive of 
different excusatory standards of virtue applicable to different realms and 
types of state activity, with the most stringent perhaps applicable to state 
activities that impinge most severely on basic human rights. We could also 
plausibly conceive of different excusatory standards applicable to the 
state’s domestic as opposed to international incarnations, to the state as a 
whole as opposed to discrete state institutions, to different such 
institutions, to states and state institutions at different stages of 
development, to state institutions as opposed to private corporations or 
individuals discharging state functions, and so forth. Likewise, even if the 
state should be expected to be expertly knowledgeable about certain 
things, excusatory standards for epistemic mistakes may well vary 
between domains of activity. Indeed, in some such domains, liberal 
restrictions on what the state should know, and seek to know, may 
themselves be quite stringent. As discussed in previous sections, different 
kinds of excusatory grounds such as complete or partial lack of basic 
responsibility, the modulating potential of group excuses for concerns 
associated with group blame and punishment, and valuable symbolism, 
may also warrant the recognition of at least some state excuses. None of 
these grounds of excuse are virtue-driven and, like in the case of epistemic 
mistake and constitutional disorder, they have nothing to do with the 
permissibility of state partiality. Thus, the possibility of legitimate 
excusatory concessions to the state may well not be as unthinkable as 
many believe.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight central theoretical puzzles 
related to the question of whether state claims of excuses may ever be 
intelligible and, if so, legitimately recognized. The arc of my argument has 
been that even if the range of excuses available to the state does not 
overlap neatly with excuses available to ordinary individuals, excuses may 
indeed be morally available to states. For some, my argument may raise 
the spectre of murderous, torturing, or otherwise wicked states being 
offered unconscionable paths to absolution. I disagree. What my argument 
does, or at least attempts to do, is to expose the challenge of state excuses 
for what it is, so that it must be addressed in all its complexity and not 
simply wished away. Of course, much work remains to be done to 
determine the appropriate grounds, precise internal structure, and apposite 
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standards of virtue and skill for specific state excuses, in specific contexts. 
A more refined understanding of the state, its functions, its susceptibility 
to holdings of moral and legal responsibility, blame, and punishment, 
perhaps developed in comparison with other social actors such as private 
corporations, would likely assist with this multifaceted task. So might 
closer scrutiny of the concepts of blame and punishment—individual and 
collective—and their relationship with excuses, as well as of my generic 
categorization as ‘excuses’ of various exculpatory claims that may in fact 
be saliently different. It also remains an open question whether all excuses 
morally available to states should be recognized by the law or whether, in 
some cases, pragmatic concerns or concerns of political morality 
constitute insuperable obstacles. 
  
Once again, my aim here was merely to map out various issues that 
appear salient to me. For all I know, when all is said and done, the realm 
of legitimate state excuses may turn out to be very limited indeed. Still, I 
hope to have said enough in this chapter to convince you that, in respect of 
many relevant facets of this debate, the jury is still out. The jury also 
remains out in respect of many aspects of the broader topic of group 
excuses considered as a class, as well as on the question of how, if at all, 
state (and, more broadly, corporate) organizational structures may affect 
the personal excuses of individuals operating under the them. The 
theoretical road ahead is rich and challenging, and I certainly hope that, in 
the near future, many more will be travelling it with me. 
 
 
